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A recent decision of the Queensland Court of Appeal (Keane JA, Fryberg and 
Applegarth JJ) will be of considerable interest to conveyancers.  The decision is 
Davidson v Bucknell [2009] QCA 383. 
 
Facts 
 
By three contracts, the plaintiff buyer agreed to buy three separate parcels of 
land from the seller.  The first contract was duly settled.  The other two contracts, 
which provided for contemporaneous settlement, were due to settle on 7 October 
2008.  Unfortunately, on the settlement date, the buyer did not have the financial 
ability to complete the two remaining contracts. 
 
Due to the buyer‟s inability to settle, the seller purported to terminate both 
contracts.  However, the buyer contested the validity of the seller‟s termination 
contending that the seller was not in a position to perform the seller‟s own 
concurrent contractual obligations at settlement under both contracts. 
 
In this regard, under the first contract, certain of the seller‟s chattels were still on 
one of the blocks of land at the settlement.  This contract involved the sale of a 
house and 1.137 hectares of land.  The contract was in the form of the fifth 
edition of the REIQ/Queensland Law Society Terms of Contract for Houses and 
Land and contained the following Standard Conditions: 
5.5  Possession of Property and Title to Included Chattels  
On the Settlement Date, in exchange for the Balance Purchase Price, the Seller must 
give the Buyer vacant possession of the Land and the Improvements except for the 
Tenancies.  Title to the Included Chattels passes at settlement. 
5.6 Reservations  
o (1)  The Seller must remove the Reserved Items from the Property before the 
Settlement Date. 
o (2)  The Seller must repair at its expense any damage done to the Property in 
removing the Reserved Items.  If the Seller fails to do so, the Buyer may repair that 
damage. 
o (3)  Any Reserved Items not removed before settlement will be considered abandoned 
and the Buyer may, without limiting its other rights, complete this contract and 
appropriate those Reserved Items or dispose of them in any way. 
o (4)  The Seller indemnifies the Buyer against any damages and expenses resulting 
from the Buyer‟s actions under clauses 5.6(2) or 5.6(3). 
At trial, the buyer argued that the seller was obliged by cl 5.6 to remove these 
chattels prior to the settlement date and that the seller‟s failure to do so meant 
that the seller was unable to give vacant possession at settlement. 
 
In relation to the second contract, as at the settlement date the land the subject 
of this contract was subject to a fixed and floating charge in favour of Suncorp 
Metway Ltd.  The seller did not have a release of this charge nor did the seller 
hold a written consent by Suncorp Metway Ltd to the transfer of the land to the 
buyer.  Accordingly, the buyer argued that the seller was unable to comply with 
the usual contractual obligation being the obligation to give the buyer a transfer 
„capable of immediate registration … free from Encumbrances.‟  
 
On 5 January 2009, the buyer commenced proceedings for specific performance 
of the two contracts on the basis of being then ready, willing and able to 
complete the contracts.  The proceedings were defended by the seller on the 
basis that the contracts were validly terminated at 5.30pm on 7 October 2008 
when the seller‟s solicitor had given notice of termination of the two contracts to 
the buyer‟s solicitor. 
 
Trial Judge 
 
The learned trial judge dismissed the buyer‟s claim holding that the seller was 
entitled to terminate the contracts on 7 October 2008.  In relation to the first 
contract, the trial judge found that some of the seller‟s belongings were in a 
shipping container on the south-eastern corner of the land.  The container was to 
be removed on the day of settlement but the arrangements were cancelled when 
the contract was not completed. 
 
The trial judge found that standard terms 5.5 and 5.6(1) did not require that the 
land be cleared of all chattels prior to the settlement date; it would suffice if the 
chattels were removed prior to settlement.  Further, his Honour opined that there 
was „considerable merit‟ in the argument that the presence of the shipping 
container on a block of land with an area of 1.137 hectares would not be an 
„impediment‟ to the buyer‟s enjoyment of the land. 
 
His Honour concluded that the seller was entitled to terminate the first contract.  
In turn, this entitlement to terminate the contract meant that the seller was 
entitled to terminate the second contract which was expressed to be (by way of a 
special condition) „subject to and conditional upon the contemporaneous 
completion of the sale‟ of the land the subject of the first contract.  Even if the 
seller could not have provided a transfer capable of registration free from the 
encumbrance of Suncorp Metway Ltd‟s charge, the seller was entitled to rely on 
the special condition to bring the second contract to an end due to the lawful 
termination of the first contract. 
 
Decision on Appeal 
 
The buyer‟s appeal was unsuccessful.  The leading judgment was delivered by 
Keane JA.1 
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 Both Fryberg J and Applegarth J agreed with the judgment delivered by Keane JA. 
 
Notwithstanding the buyer‟s intimation that they would be unable to settle on the 
due date, Keane JA opined that the better view was that the seller simply 
overlooked the matters of complaint raised by buyer namely the requirement to 
remove the chattels under the first contract and to arrange a release of Suncorp 
Metway Ltd‟s charge under the second contract.  The legal effect of these 
oversights was separately considered by Keane JA. 
 
Failure to Remove the Chattels 
 
Keane JA noted that at general law, a seller cannot provide vacant possession if 
there is some „impediment which substantially prevents or interferes with the 
enjoyment of the right to possession of a substantial part of the property‟.2  On 
the given facts it was not disputed by the buyer that the seller was able to provide 
vacant possession in this sense.  However, for the buyer it was argued that 
standard condition 5.6(1) of the REIQ contract qualified the general law concept 
of „vacant possession‟ such that if the seller was in breach of standard condition 
5.6(1) they were also in breach of the obligation under standard condition 5.5 to 
provide vacant possession.  Keane JA was not prepared to accede to this 
argument.  Keane JA opined that standard condition 5.6(1) was a machinery 
provision that was not intended to alter the concept of vacant possession under 
the general law.  Keane JA noted that a buyer could suffer no diminution in the 
value of their bargain by reason of a mere breach of standard condition 5.6(1). 
 
Failure to Arrange a Release of the Company Charge 
 
In relation to the second contract, and the presence of the fixed and floating 
charge that had not been released, the observations made by Keane JA will be 
of considerable interest to conveyancers. 
 
The first observation made was that by virtue of s 262(8) of the Corporations Act 
2001 (Cth), Suncorp Metway Ltd‟s charge could not affect the buyer‟s title once 
the transfer to the buyer had been registered under the Land Title Act 1994 (Qld). 
 
Keane JA then went on to make a further observation as follows: 
 [40] Further, the mere existence of the fixed and floating charge could not have impeded 
the “immediate registration … in the appropriate office free from Encumbrances” of the 
“properly executed transfer” in accordance with the contract.  To the extent that the fixed 
and floating charge might have created an equitable interest in Suncorp Metway in respect 
of the land which might have supported a caveat by the chargee, the chargee‟s failure to 
lodge a caveat to protect that equitable interest meant that the chargee‟s interest would 
have been postponed to the equitable interest of the purchasers and their legal right to 
registration of the transfer.  
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 Citing Cumberland Consolidated Holdings Ltd v Ireland [1946] KB 264, 287. 
In making this observation, Keane JA cited Clarke v Raymor (Brisbane) Pty Ltd 
(No 2)3 and noted that in accordance with that decision the buyer‟s entitlement to 
registration free of encumbrances would prevail over any equity in Suncorp 
Metway Ltd. 
 
Ultimately, Keane JA found it unnecessary to resolve this argument as he agreed 
with the learned trial judge that the seller was entitled to rely on special condition 
6 in the second contract and their lawful termination of the first contract to justify 
termination of the second contract.  As the first contract could not be completed, 
without any default by the seller being involved, the seller was entitled to 
terminate the second contract (relying on the special condition) notwithstanding 
that the seller may not have been entitled to charge the buyer with breach of the 
second contract. 
 
Comment 
 
Although the result in this litigation may not be surprising, the obiter comments 
made concerning the presence of an unreleased fixed and floating charge will 
surprise a number of practitioners.  Where a release of a charge of this nature is 
not provided at settlement, the equitable interest of the chargee would permit the 
lodgment of a caveat which would (if lodged after settlement), in turn, prevent 
registration of the buyer‟s transfer. 
 
In these circumstances, notwithstanding the Court of Appeal‟s observation that 
the buyer‟s entitlement to registration would prevail (in the absence of a caveat 
having been lodged prior to settlement), to obtain this result would require an 
application to remove the caveat lodged by the chargee. 
 
The fact that there was evidence that the chargee in this instance was not 
disposed to seek to prevent the registration of the transfer from the seller to the 
buyer and therefore unlikely to lodge a caveat after the settlement date was 
evidence that seems to have only been adduced for trial purposes.  
Notwithstanding the observations of the Court of Appeal, in accordance with the 
current requirements of the Queensland Conveyancing Protocol, a release of the 
charge should be provided at settlement in these circumstances. 
 
 
BD 
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 [1982] Qd R 790, 792-793, 799-800. 
